# 1NC

## Off

The United States federal government should

- cancel the content of all elements found inconsistent World Trade Organizational agreements including elements found in but not limited to renewable energy projects in Washington, the State Solar Rebate Project II in Massachusetts, wind production and manufacturing in Ohio, renewable energy projects and manufacturing in New Jersey, and self-generating projects in California,

- not offer Mexico to increase Mexican non-corn biofuel exports to the United States,

- ensure fair market treatment to Chinese energy products,

- ban the consumption of corn ethanol products,

- increase investment in biomanufacturing,

- and eliminate nearly all domestic support for biofuel by repealing conventional biofuel requirements under the Renewable Fuels Standard, the Blenders Tax Credit for conventional biofuels, and the tariff on imports of ethanol.

Planks 1 and 3 solve advantage 1

Beetz, their author, 12 (Becky Beetz, 8/22/12, “China concludes US solar subsidies violate WTO rules”, <http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/china-concludes-us-solar-subsidies-violate-wto-rules_100008155/#axzz2d8f2h8uO>) gz

"As a consequence," stated MOFCOM on its website, they "distort the normal trade and constitutes the trade barrier to the Chinese renewable energy products exports to the U.S." The ministry added that it will now take "relevant measures in accordance with the law to require the U.S. to cancel the content of the measures under investigation inconsistent with WTO agreements, and give fair treatment to renewable energy products exported from China."¶

GBN’s card ends

The programs in question include:¶ The encouragement of renewable energy projects in Washington;¶ The State Solar Rebate Project II in Massachusetts;¶ The encouragement of wind production and manufacturing in Ohio;¶ The encouragement of renewable energy projects and manufacturing in New Jersey; and¶ Self-generating projects in California.

Plank 4 solves advantage 2 – entire advantage is a solvency advocate because it normatively prescribes that corn ethanol is a bad thing

Plank 5 solves bioterror

Davey et al., 3 (Congress Chair: Brian Davey (OPCW/ the Netherlands) Congress Co-Chair: Barbara Price (U.S.) Congress Co-Chair: Slavko Bokan (Croatia)"The Second World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism", September 2003, http://cbmts-industry.com/upload/86495c13658b330ae0e516baa458dde5.pdf)

A flexible, creative, and rapidly responsive biomanufacturing infrastructure is an **essential part** of an effective overall strategy for bioterrorism preparedness and biological defense. The multi-faceted approach to biological manufacturing being advanced by the U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center and its partners in government, academia and industry. State-of-the- art biological manufacturing methods (efficient cell culture reactors, cost analysis studies) as well as traditional methods (fermentation) and an advanced cryorepository are being used to solve problems in biological agent detection, agent simulation, environmental decontamination and the production of biological for human clinical trials. Results from additional research on real-time optical monitoring of in vivo production of recombinant proteins are available.

Plank 6 solves advantages 1 and 2

Christopher Hurt, et al. agricultural economists on the faculty at Purdue University, “What’s Driving Food Prices?” Farm Foundation Issue Report, July 2008, available online at: <http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/404-FINAL%20WDFP%20REPORT%207-28-08.pdf>

The U.S. tariff on imported ethanol introduces a potentially greater distortion than does the subsidy or mandate. Since high oil prices directly lead to higher corn prices, corn ethanol becomes much more expensive. Sugarcane-based ethanol is less expensive to produce than corn ethanol at any oil price, but the gap widens at higher oil prices. So removal of the tariff on imported ethanol would lead to the biofuel coming from the lowest cost source–sugarcane–which would reduce some pressure on corn prices and provide the United States with lower cost ethanol. Brazil has the potential to expand ethanol production substantially without increasing world sugar prices substantially, so imports down the road could be quite high. However, the question is more complicated because it depends on the extent to which imported ethanol adds to total consumption and the extent to which it displaces corn ethanol. For that portion that displaced corn ethanol, each billion gallons of imports would displace about 358 million bushels of corn used for ethanol. So you would get price impacts as the ethanol industry demanded less corn. The problem is figuring out how much would go to increase total consumption and how much to displace corn ethanol. In the United States, the limit of how much ethanol can be blended is called the blending wall.14 Until we hit the blending wall, most of it likely would increase total consumption and not displace corn ethanol. However, we will probably reach the blending wall in 2009, at which point imports would likely displace domestic corn ethanol and thereby lower corn price.

## Off

#### China’s engagement in Latin America is high now and its zero sum- even if US engagement is happening now, China’s influence is overpowering us

**Rosenthal, 9/11** – political consultant and writer who is currently interning at The Center for Security Policy in Washington DC (Terence, 2013, “China’s Pivot to Latin America”, Global Balita, http://globalbalita.com/2013/09/11/chinas-pivot-to-latin-america/)//VP

The quest for global naval power runs parallel to competition for control of markets in Latin America.. The two largest world economies, the United States, and China are vying for control of these markets. China has an enormous population of approximately 1.3 billion people but is only able to use a very small percentage of its land mass. Its’ consumer market is the wealthiest it has been in modern times. China desires access to key resources such as petroleum, coal, iron, uranium, as well as agricultural products. Latin America is in high global demand, with 500 million people, and a $3trillion market. In its quest to be Latin America’s foremost business partner, China has risen out of ambiguity to become one of the top three exporters, sometimes surpassing the United States in countries like Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil. China has sought to be the prime lender in Latin America, loaning $110 billion dollars thus exceeding the World Bank’s contribution for the past two years. Some of China’s other most noteworthy loans include $28 billion to Venezuela, $10.2 billion to the Argentine debt swap, and 10 billion to Brazilian oil company, Petrobras. China wishes to benefit from developing infrastructure, ports, roads and rail systems in Latin America. In Nicaragua, China is planning the start of a canal bigger than the Panama Canal, facilitating passage to larger container ships than the Panama Canal is now able to handle. In Panama, China controls the leases at both ends of the Panama Canal and is in the process of widening the Canal in order to accommodate larger vessels. This constitutes excellent strategic positioning for China, giving them virtual control over two major passageways. Though a huge amount of the world’s trade transits the Panama Canal, the United States remains its biggest user. China’s economic relations in the Caribbean are also growing by leaps and bounds. Consider a $2.6 billion resort, among a gaggle of Chinese owned hotels and casinos being built by the Chinese in the Bahamas, 80 miles off the U.S. coast. Or Complant, a Chinese company, investing millions of dollars in Jamaica’s sugar industry. The Bahamas and Jamaica are great strategic places for the Chinese to invest due to their close proximity to the U.S., as well as in Cuba, with whom they already have solid military, diplomatic and commercial relations. In recent years, China has embarked on a well-planned pivot to Latin America, focusing on a multifaceted military approach. In terms of soft military power, the Chinese naval hospital, Peace Ark has sailed the Caribbean offering medical and military services, similar to America’s USNS Comfort, but, with the addition of military council. China conducts military exchange and arm sales with Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. In Argentina, the Chinese are providing technological assistance with aircraft and helicopters and in Brazil with civilian and military operations. In addition, specific attention is being paid to Venezuela as a launching pad for military and diplomatic influence in South America.

#### China’s influence in Mexican trade is *expanding*

- Mexico & US trade decreasing because China’s trading more & more with Mexico

- US losing Latin American trade

Shaiken et al ‘13

[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]

This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated itself into North America in a process beginning in 2001 with China’s adherence to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both Mexico and the U.S. were increasing and deepening trade relations and regional specializations within the parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001, however, this process has reversed as a result of China’s massive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico.¶ The analysis presented herein shows that China’s rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each country’s respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others.¶ NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the “gaps” between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexico’s highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-…), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper).

#### Increased US-Mexico relations crowd out China

Fischer, 12 – Analyst for Capitol Media (Howard, “Fox Says US-Mexico Ties Deter China’s Influence”, September 14, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/fox-says-us-mexico-ties-deter-china-s-influence/article\_b8fd3834-acdc-5b33-b1fb-d983fdf8d2de.html)//VP

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico - including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances. "It has to be based on humanism, on compassion, on love, on friendship, on neighborhood and on partnership that we have together," Fox said. "Otherwise, we will keep losing the jobs to the East." Fox, who served as president from 2000 to 2006, insisted he is not in favor of "open borders." "But I am in favor of the use of our talent, our wisdom, our intelligence," Fox said. And that requires finally filling the vacuum of what kind of laws on immigration are necessary. In his speech, Fox did not address Arizona's approval of SB 1070 two years ago in an effort to give state and local police more power to detain and arrest suspected illegal immigrants. But in response to a question afterward, he said Arizona and other states have waded into the fray with their own laws out of frustration with the lack of action in Washington. "At the very end, migration is a national issue," Fox said. With immigration reform stalled in Congress, "state governments and state legislatures have been forced to get involved." Fox said that what's needed now is for lawmakers in Washington to come up with at least a framework for reform. "We need to know what the playground is and what the rules of the game are," he said, calling on leaders to "put aside xenophobia, put aside all of our complaints that we might have, and sit down and discuss the differences." Fox said it also needs to be recognized that this is not just a one-way relationship, saying Mexico buys $250 billion of U.S. products every year, meaning "millions of jobs" to this country's economy.

#### China’s engagement in Latin America is key to its economy

Farnsworth, 12 – Vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC (Eric, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)//VP

What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

#### That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 **–** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

#### China influence solves every impact – collapse causes conflict

Zhang ’12 [Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm ]

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

## Trade

No risk of protectionism

**Kim 13**

Soo Yeon Kim, of the National University of Singapore, associate professor of music at Nazareth College of Rochester, New York, Fellow of the Transatlantic Academy, based at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, The Monkey Cage, January 30, 2013, " Protectionism During Recessions: Is This Time Different?", http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2013/01/30/protectionism-during-recessions-is-this-time-different/

The Great Recession of 2008: Who Resisted Protectionism? There is widespread agreement regarding the critical role of international institutions as “firewalls” against protectionism during this recession. Economic and non-economic international institutions have served as conveyors of information and mechanisms of commitment and socialization. Their informational function enhances the transparency and accountability of states’ trade policies, and they mitigate uncertainty when it is running high. Specialized international institutions devoted to trade, such as the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), also lock in commitments to liberal trade through legal obligations that make defections costly, thus creating accountability in the actions of its members. Equally important, international institutions are also arenas of socialization that help propagate important norms such as the commitment to the liberal trading system and cooperative economic behavior. In this connection, the degree to which a particular country was embedded in the global network of economic and non-economic international institutions has been found to be strongly correlated with fewer instances of protectionist trade measures. Information provided to date by international institutions, with the exception of the GTA project, largely agree that states have not resorted to large-scale protectionism during this recession, in spite of the fact that the “great trade collapse” at the beginning of the current crisis was steeper and more sudden than that of its Great Depression predecessor. The WTO Secretariat, in addition to its regular individual reports on members’ trade policies under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), has issued more than a dozen reports on member states’ trade policies during the crisis. At the request of the G-20 countries, which pledged not to adopt protectionist trade measures at the onset of the crisis in 2008, the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD have produced joint reports on the trade and investment measures of the world’s largest trading states. They, too, find that G-20 countries had largely adhered to their commitment not to raise trade and investment barriers. In the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers (TTB) project, an important and unique data collection that includes information on pre-crisis and crisis trade policy behavior, Bown finds that temporary trade barriers such as safeguards, countervailing and antidumping duties saw only a slight increase of usage by developed countries, in the neighborhood of 4%. In contrast, emerging market economies were the heavy users of TTBs, whose usage rose by almost 40% between 2008 and 2009. As scholarly insights accumulate on the current recession and its impact on protectionism (or lack thereof), two questions emerge for further research. First, to what extent have governments employed policy substitutes that have the same effect as trade protectionism? International institutions may appear to have been successful in preventing protectionism, but governments may well have looked elsewhere to defend national economies. This question can be seen in the broader context of the “open economy trilemma,” in which governments may achieve only two of three macroeconomic policy objectives: stable exchange rates, stable prices, and open trade. Irwin argues that governments that abandoned the gold standard during the Great Depression were less protectionist, and their economies also suffered less from the recession. Existing scholarship also indicates that governments are likely to employ policy substitutes, opting for monetary autonomy when facing trade policy constraints, for example, due to membership in a preferential trade agreement. Moreover, at the time of writing, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced that it has dropped its objections to capital controls, albeit cautiously and only under certain conditions, thus potentially providing another policy alternative for governments to achieve economic stability during this crisis. Future research may further extend the application to policy substitutes that are deployed during economic downturns. Finally, why did firms not push for more protection? Protectionist policies are not adopted by governments in a political vacuum. In order to adopt trade defense measures such as anti-dumping duties, governments first conduct investigations to assess the extent of injury. Such investigations are initiated when firms apply for them through the domestic political process. If indeed governments did not appeal extensively or unusually to protectionist trade policies, the explanation to a significant degree lies in firm behavior. A distinguished body of research exists in this area that is due for a revisit in the age of extensive international supply chains, from Schattschneider’s classic examination of the domestic pressures that led to the Smoot-Hawley Act to Helen Milner’s study of export-dependent firms that resisted protectionism during the crisis of the 1920s and the 1970s. Milner rightly pointed out that “firms are central,” and over the years the export-dependent, multinational firm has evolved in tandem with the increasing complexity of the international supply chain. Today’s firm is not only heavily export-dependent but equally import-dependent in its reliance on intermediate inputs, whether through intra-firm trade or from foreign firms. The extensive international supply chain thus often puts exporting and importing firms on the same side of the political debate, especially when they are members of large multinational firms. Moreover, the study of firm-level behavior must extend beyond the developed world to consider firms in emerging market economies, which have been the heavy users of trade defense measures during the current recession. How the internationalization of production, driven by investment and trade in intermediate goods, restrained multinational firms from pushing for more protection remains an important question for further research.

**Trade spreads disease—conclusive evidence**

Sciencedaily 11 Sciencedaly.com, cites study done by researchers at the UK research councils’ Rural Economy and Land use programme, June 9, “Is Free Global Trade Too Great a Threat to Food Supplies, Natural Heritage and Health?”, [http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/06/110609083226.html]

Researchers from the UK Research Councils' Rural Economy and Land Use Programme say that we face a future of uncertainty, and possible new threats to our food supplies, natural heritage, and even human health, from animal and plant pathogens. Human behaviour, travel and trade exacerbates the problem and we may need to reconsider our approach to free trade. We face a future of uncertainty, and possible new threats to our food supplies, natural heritage, and even human health, from animal and plant pathogens, according to researchers from the UK Research Councils' Rural Economy and Land Use Programme. In a special issue of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, the academics take a fresh look at infectious diseases of animals and plants, from an interdisciplinary perspective. They conclude that increasing global trade may put us at greater risk from pathogens in the future, as more exotic diseases enter the country. This process is already happening, particularly in plant disease. Climate change is driving shifts in cropping patterns across the world and they may take pests and diseases with them. We are also seeing completely new pathogens evolve, while existing ones develop the ability to infect new hosts. During the 20th century the number of new fungal, bacterial and viral diseases in plants appearing in Europe rose from less than five per decade to over 20. But these problems are exacerbated by human behaviour, and understanding this could be key to helping policymakers deal with risk and uncertainty. In many cases the spread of disease is caused by increased trade, transport and travel. Trends in the international horticultural industry have been towards fewer, larger producers, supplying vast numbers of retailers. Thus, disease which begins in one location may be spread far and wide. Changes in the livestock trade have similar effects at national level. Reduction in income per animal, and the introduction of mechanisation, means that fewer farmers manage more animals per farm, and animals are moved around more frequently. They may be born in one location but sold on and reared elsewhere. Government policy and the classification of diseases may even increase the risks. Farmers restocking to combat one disease may, unwittingly, introduce another.

Spread of disease causes extinction

Rhett Butler 6-- BS from UCSD, founder of Mongabay.com, speaker at Stanford University, UC Berkeley, UCSC, participant in the US State Department Speakers Program in Indonesia, “LOSS OF SPECIES FOR FOREST REGENERATION,” [rainforests.mongabay.com/0904.htm]

Disease can break out among humans. Although not unleashed yet, someday one of these microscopic killers could lead to a massive human die-off as deadly for our species as we have been for the species of the rainforest. Until then, local populations will continue to be menaced by mosquito-borne diseases like dengue fever, Rift Valley fever, and malaria, and water-borne diseases like cholera. Many emergent and resurgent diseases are directly linked to land alterations which bring humans in closer contact with such pathogens. For example, malaria and snailborne schistosomiasis have escalated because of the creation of artificial pools of water like dams, rice paddies, drainage ditches, irrigation canals, and puddles created by tractor treads. Malaria is a particular problem in deforested and degraded areas, though not in forested zones where there are few stagnant ground pools for mosquito breeding. These pools are most abundant in cleared regions and areas where tractors tear gashes in the earth. Malaria is already a major threat to indigenous peoples who have developed no resistance to the disease nor any access to antimalarial drugs. Malaria alone is cited as being responsible for killing an estimated 20 percent of the Yanomani in Brazil and Venezuela. Malaria—caused by unicelluar parasites transferred in the saliva of mosquitoes when they bite—is an especially frightening disease for its drug-resistant forms. Thanks to poor prescribing techniques on the part of doctors, there are now strains in Southeast Asia reputed to be resistant to more than 20 anti-malarial drugs. There is serious concern that global climate change will affect the distribution of malaria, which currently infects roughly 270 million people worldwide and kills 1-2 million a year— 430,000-680,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa alone. The outbreak of disease in the tropics does not affect only the people of those countries, since virtually any disease can be incubated for enough time to allow penetration into the temperate developed countries. For example, any Central African doctor infected with the ebola virus from a patient can board a plane and land in London within 10 hours. The virus could quickly spread, especially if airborne, among the city's population of 8 million. Additionally, every person at the airport who is exposed can unknowingly carry the pathogen home to their native countries around the world.

#### Doesn’t cause extinction

**NIPCC, 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change; “Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC,” 3/8/2011, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

## Ethanol

**High food prices key to Russian growth**

**AP NEWSWIRE 9-10-2008** ([www.newsday.com/business/investing/wire/sns-ap-russian-breadbasket,0,5647019.story](http://www.newsday.com/business/investing/wire/sns-ap-russian-breadbasket,0,5647019.story))

An American-made combine harvests barley doing the job of five Soviet tractors on this patch of the "Black Earth" region — a glimpse into changes sweeping Russian agriculture that have raised hopes of transforming a once backward industry into a breadbasket. Lured by soaring food prices, corporations — both domestic and foreign — have been snapping up land in this fertile region the size of France, replacing inefficient Soviet-style collective farming with modern farming techniques and economies of scale. "Foreigners who come here get astonished at the gleaming black earth," said Viktor Karnushin, head of a local subsidiary of Sweden's Black Earth Farming corporation — one of the biggest foreign players in Russian farming. Russian government officials recently announced plans to transform the country into the world's leading grain exporter within five years. While there are skeptics, Natasha Zavozdina at investment bank Renaissance Capital said the target is realistic. "With $70 billion investment within 5 or 7 years ... the goal will be achieved," she said. "As long as production is profitable, public and private investment will be flowing in." Meanwhile, the Kremlin plans to form a state trading company to broker about half of the country's millions of tons of grain exports, expanding its control of who buys Russia's cereals and how much they pay for them. That has led to concern abroad that Russia may use its grain as it uses its control of the nation's enormous oil and natural gas wealth — as leverage for diplomatic and political goals. There's lots of room for Russia to ramp up its farm production. Russia is the globe's largest country geographically, and has almost one hectare out of every ten of the world's arable land. According to analyst estimates, the Soviets farmed 314 million acres of Russian land in 1985. But in 2007, Russian farmers cultivated only 190 million acres — a 40 percent drop. Much of Russia's land is marginal and millions of acres of farmland are located far north in areas with short growing seasons. But the Black Earth region stretching across Southern Russia and neighboring Ukraine is some of the most fertile land in Europe. Much of Russia's fertile land was abandoned after the Soviet collapse, as thousands flooded into urban areas, and investors see an opportunity. The government launched an agricultural renovation program in 2001 that restricted farm imports, reduced taxes, subsidized loans and provided farmers with cheap equipment leasing. Rising food prices have done the rest. Production and investment have been on a steady rise in the past five years although many farms are far from Western standards of efficiency. This year's wheat crop is widely forecast to be the highest since 1978. Ivan Nikolaev of Renaissance Capital sees Russia as the world's biggest grain exporter, second only to the United States, in five years. "The government has created a very favorable investment climate," Nikolaev said. Viktor Gulov, director general of Agrolipetsk, one of Black Earth Farming's subsidiaries, said Russian farming has great growth potential, while "the West has already hit the ceiling in terms of harvest volume and arable land areas." Investors paid relatively little attention to Russian agriculture in the 1990s because of low food prices and the lure of quicker profits in other areas, including energy and metals. But that has changed. Foreign investment in Russian agriculture and forestry nearly tripled between 2005 and 2007, from $158 million to $468 million, according to the national statistics agency. Russian farming seems poised to boom even without bringing many more fields into production. In Soviet times, Karnushin said, farmers were lucky to get 2.5 tons of wheat out of a hectare (about 2.5 acres) of land. Using modern technology and farming methods, his company today expects to harvest at least five tons of wheat out of the same plot, he said.

**Nuclear war**

**FILGER 2009** (Sheldon, author and blogger for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction” <http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356>)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

Seriously they don’t solve food prices—tons of things overcome

First, warming

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Global warming has already harmed the world's food production and has driven up food prices by as much as 20% over recent decades, new research has revealed. The drop in the productivity of crop plants around the world was not caused by changes in rainfall but was because higher temperatures can cause dehydration, prevent pollination and lead to slowed photosynthesis. Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, Washington DC, said the findings indicate a turning point: "Agriculture as it exists today evolved over 11,000 years of reasonably stable climate, but that climate system is no more." Adaptation is difficult because our knowledge of the future is not strong enough to drive new investments, he said, "so we just keep going, hoping for the best." The scientists say their work shows how crucial it is to find ways to adapt farming to a warmer world, to ensure that rises in global population are matched by rising food production. "It is vital," said Wolfram Schlenker, at Columbia University in New York and one of the research team. "If we continue to have the same seed varieties and temperatures continue to rise, then food prices will rise further. [Addressing] that is the big question." The new research joins a small number of studies in which the fingerprint of climate change has been separated from natural variations in weather and other factors, demonstrating that the effects of warming have already been felt in the world. Scientists have shown that the chance of the severe heatwave that killed thousands in Europe in 2003 was made twice as likely by global warming, while other work showed that the floods that caused £3.5bn of damage in England in 2000 were made two to three times more likely.

And weather

Tim **Schooley 11**, Pittsburgh Business Times, “Oil prices, bad weather send food prices skyward”, May 6, <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/print-edition/2011/05/06/oil-prices-weather-food-proces-skyward.html>

Along with fast-rising fuel prices, weather-induced crop shortfalls also are affecting food prices. Those in the food and restaurant industries say they haven’t seen the kind of business challenges they are now since the gas price spike and credit crisis of 2008. “I don’t think the weather instability has ever been as hostile in the last 100 years as it was in the last 12 months,” wrote Jeremy Grantham, chief investment officer of GMO Capital, an investment management firm, in a recent report. “If you were to read a one-paragraph summary of almost any agricultural commodity, you would see weather listed as one of the causes of the price rising.” The U.S. Department of AgriculturebizWatch U.S. Department of Agriculture Latest from The Business Journals Federal aid available for fire-damaged homes, communitiesHare Wynn secures 0M settlement in rice caseTwo DeKalb DFCS workers guilty of fraud Follow this company projects rising prices for a host of food commodities: Beef, up 6 percent to 8 percent; pork, up 7.5 percent. Corn prices have doubled since last year, and wheat prices remain at near record highs.

## Mex Econ

#### Increasing resource production causes Dutch Disease – drives up prices for domestic goods and services, wrecking the economy

Holland, Energy Trends Insider, 12

[Andrew, 6-7-12, Energy Trends Insider, “Will Dutch Disease Follow-on the American Energy Boom?,” <http://www.energytrendsinsider.com/2012/06/07/will-dutch-disease-follow-on-the-american-energy-boom/>, accessed 7-12-13, MSG]

An ongoing discussion among some of us analysts at Consumer Energy Report has been about whether having natural resources like oil or coal is actually beneficial to a country (see Are Countries With Vast Oil Resources Blessed or Cursed?, Oil Dependence — Tom Friedman’s False Narrative, and Oil — Easy to Produce, But Not Easy to Buy). The argument which I’ve made is that a boom in natural resources production can cover up some short-sighted economic policies; in effect, the earnings from producing oil mean that countries do not have to invest in their education or produce their own manufactured goods. The other side of the argument is that it can only be a good thing for new resources to be found. Leaving aside the question of whether natural resource wealth undermines institutions or causes corruption (and there is good evidence of a resource curse among developing countries) there is one thing that increased production of oil does, once it gets to be a big enough sector of the economy: it pushes up the value of that country’s currency. All else equal (as economists always have to say), new production of natural resources strengthens the domestic currency. That’s because those resources are either exported or are used to replace imports. Dutch Disease Phenomenon Now – I should mention that I like a strong dollar, personally: it means I can afford to travel abroad more, and buy more when I get there. It also means that French wine (for example) becomes cheaper relative to Californian wine. I like French wine, and would welcome being able to buy more. However, that shows the problem with having a strong currency — it undermines domestic manufacturing and production (of Californian wine, in this example) by driving up prices of American-made goods and services. This phenomenon is called “Dutch Disease.” Coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe how finding natural gas in the North Sea in 1959 affected the Netherlands’ economy over the ensuing decades. The symptoms of the ‘disease’ are when commodity exports push up the value of a nation’s currency, making other parts of the economy less competitive. This leads to a current-account deficit, which makes the economy even more dependent upon the commodity. The disease is especially pernicious for commodities like oil, coal, and natural gas because these industries are very capital-intensive, and actually do not generate that many jobs. There are two major industrialized countries that have undergone commodities booms over the past decade: Canada and Australia. They are both showing signs of suffering from Dutch Disease, with the Canadian dollar increasing in value vs. the American dollar (Canada’s #1 trading partner by far) by over 50% in the last ten years, and the Australian dollar increased in value compared to world currency rates by almost 70% in the past decade.

#### Dutch Disease as it pertains to resource production vastly increases the risk of divides that lead to civil wars, genocide, and all forms of instability

Shaxson, Chatham House Associate Fellow, 7

[Nicholas, November 2007, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Oil, Corruption, and the Resource Curse,” jstor, p 1127-1128, Accessed 7/13/13, CB]

Consider two different hypothetical countries: Agricolia, an agricultural¶ economy, and Petroland, which depends entirely on oil. Both are divided politically¶ between North and South. When Southern Agricolia has a bumper crop, this doesn't¶ necessarily harm North Agricolia. because it doesn't take anything away from it (and¶ the North's residents may even benefit from more economic activity nearby).

Petroland is different. The total amount of oil money available for the whole¶ country this year is a given: it depends on world oil prices, the oil contracts,¶ technology, geology, financing and oil production rates, and there isn't much¶ ordinary citizens can do to change any of these variables in this economic enclave.¶ Sharing out this fixed sum of money is a zero-sum game: more for the South means¶ less for the North. Here is a classic recipe for conflict. Now, even if North and South¶ settle on a formula, the problem isn't over yet—for the Northeast will now have to¶ compete with the Northwest. And so on, down to village level—as inhabitants of¶ the Niger Delta, used to fighting for a share of local spoils, will attest. The drivers¶ of conflict spread downwards, fragmenting society at each level. For example, after¶ Nigeria's independence in 1960, the state split from three regions into four, then¶ into twelve states, then 19, 21, 31; today there are 36. This subdivision was driven¶ to a significant degree by divide-and-rule politics and the complaints of minorities¶ in each state about not getting a fair share of the 'cake'. Yet each subdivision simply¶ created new configurations, new minorities and more numerous divisions.

The economist William Easterly describes cross-country studies which highlight how ethnically diverse societies suffer, among other things, a significantly¶ higher probability of civil war and of genocide, and higher black market premiums,¶ as well as far lower economic growth, lower schooling rates and fewer paved roads.¶ He points out that economists and donors, however, have paid remarkably little¶ atrention to the effects of ethnic polarization on economic growth. Analysis needs¶ to move further, beyond seeing ethnic (and other) diversity as a static phenom-¶ enon, and understand better how polarization and social fragmentation—and the¶ perceptions of these divisions—are affected by conflicts over mineral money, and¶ how all these factors in turn impact on poverty, growth, corruption and conflict.

The divisions (and perceptions of divisions) are not always ethnic or religious.¶ One case in point would be the kind of rural/urban divide that was for years a¶ key part of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi's discourse, and an important¶ factor in the Angolan civil wars. Divisions can involve political factions that arc¶ not ethnically based. Another example would be horizontal divisions, such as that¶ which is apparent in all oil-dependent countries between the charmed elites and¶ the masses of poor. Empirically, there is plenty of evidence that more divided¶ societies perform less well than more homogeneous ones: 'Societies divided into¶ factions fight over division of the spoils,\* Easterly wrote; 'societies unified by a¶ common culture and a strong middle class create a consensus for growth—growth¶ that includes the poor." (In fact, he characterized the idea of factions acting in their¶ own interests as being chiefly responsible for bad government policies as the key¶ insight in the field of political economy.)

Drug cartels are key to the Mexican economy – generates valuable liquidity in the banking system

Lange, 10 – Washington Correspondent for Reuters, citing US officials in Mexico; additional reporting by Lizbeth Diaz in Tijuana (Jason, “From spas to banks, Mexico economy rides on drugs,” Reuters, 22 January 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/22/us-drugs-mexico-economy-idUSTRE60L0X120100122)

Mexican cartels, which control most of the cocaine and methamphetamine smuggled into the United States, bring an estimated $25 billion to $40 billion into Mexico from their global operations every year. To put that in perspective: Mexico probably made more money in 2009 moving drugs than it did exporting oil, its single biggest legitimate foreign currency earner. From the white Caribbean beaches of Cancun to violent towns on the U.S. border and the beauty parlors of Mexico City's wealthy suburbs, drug cash is everywhere in Mexico. It has even propped up the country's banking system, helping it ride out the financial crisis and aiding the country's economy. Smuggled into Mexico mostly from the United States in $100 bills, narco money finds its way onto the books of restaurants, construction firms and bars as drug lords try to legitimize their cash and prevent police from tracing it. "Mexico is saturated with this money," said George Friedman, who heads geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor. In western Mexico, drug money started pouring into Zapopan and nearby Guadalajara in the 1980s as the Sinaloa cartel bought hospitals and real estate, said Martin Barron, a researcher at the institute that trains Mexico's organized crime prosecutors. Now residents in the region known in Mexico for its piety say drug smugglers barely make an effort to disguise themselves. A strip of fancy boutiques in Zapopan was financed with drug money, says Jaime Ramirez, a local newspaper columnist who has been reporting on the drug world for two decades. As well as the Grupo Collins factory in Zapopan, a nearby car wash is also on the U.S. Treasury's black list. A local cemetery draws relatives of traffickers who were among the 17,000 people killed in the drug war in Mexico since 2006. "A lot of narcos are buried there. You should see it on Fathers' Day," Ramirez said, as a black pick-up truck with tinted windows pulled in. Zapopan residents just shrug their shoulders when a wealthy neighbor displays traits seen as typical of a drug trafficker -- wearing cowboy gear, playing loud "norteno" music from the country's north or holding lavish parties attended by guests who arrive in pick-up trucks or SUVs. "Living alongside them is normal," Ramirez said. "Everybody knows when a neighbor is on the shady side." One of those neighbors was Sandra Avila, a glamorous trafficker known as the "Queen of the Pacific," who lived in Zapopan before being arrested in Mexico City in 2007. On a typical day in Zapopan recently, men unloaded boxes from vans in the Grupo Collins compound, near the company's private chapel and soccer field. From behind the factory's high walls, there was little to suggest it could have ties to a cartel. "It has always been really calm," said Genaro Rangel, who sells tacos every morning to factory workers from a stall across the street. The plant was advertising a job opening on the company web site for a machine room technician. Washington's accusation, filed under a U.S. sanctions program, makes it illegal for Americans to do business with Grupo Collins and freezes any assets it might have in U.S. accounts. In a 2006 report, Mexican authorities named Grupo Collins' owner Telesforo Tirado as an operator of the Colima cartel. The U.S. Treasury and Mexico's Attorney General's office both declined to provide further details on the case and Grupo Collins executives also refused to comment. But Tirado has previously denied the charges in the Mexican media. CASHING IN ON THE DRUG TRADE What's going on in Zapopan is happening all over Mexico. A well-known Mexico City restaurant specializing in the spicy cuisine of the Yucatan peninsula was added to the U.S. list of front companies in December. Months earlier, one of Mexico's top food critics had recommended it. Drug money has also fueled part of a real estate boom around tourist resorts such as Cancun, said a senior U.S. law enforcement official in Mexico City. "We've had cases where traffickers purchased large tracts of land in areas where any investor would buy," he said, asking not to be named because of concerns about his safety. An architect in the city of Tijuana did well out of designing buildings that cartels would build and rent out to legitimate local businesses. "The pay was enough for me to build a house for myself, as well as to buy a lot a tools," he said. He was once hired to design a tunnel that led to the street from a secret door in a drug gang member's closet. Craving acceptance, the drug gangs even throw their money at acquaintances to get them on the social scene. A drug trafficker pays his friend Roberto, who declined to give his last name, to keep him connected in Tijuana and introduce him to women. "I take him to parties," Roberto said. In the wealthy shopping areas of Interlomas, near Mexico City, the Perfect Silhouette spa offers breast implants. Staffed by young women in loose-fitting white suits, the spa also sells weight-loss creams and offers massages. The U.S. Treasury recently said it was part of the financial network of the Beltran Leyva cartel, whose leader was gunned down by elite Mexican marines in December. The salon's manager, Teresa Delgado, appeared baffled by the U.S. accusations. "We haven't seen anything strange here," she said. A woman Delgado identified as the owner did not return a phone call requesting an interview. Businesses enlisted to launder drug money typically get a cut worth 3 percent to 8 percent of the funds passing through their books, the U.S. law enforcement official said. "SMURFING" AROUND THE LAWS Much of the cartels' profits eventually ends up in Mexico's banking system, the U.S. official said. During the global financial crisis last year, those assets provided valuable liquidity, says economist Guillermo Ibarra of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. "They had a cushion from drug trafficking money that to a certain extent helped the banks," Ibarra said. Indeed, drug money in banks is a global phenomenon, not just in Mexico. A United Nations report on the global drug trade in 2009 said that "at a time of major bank failures, money doesn't smell, bankers seem to believe." Drug gangs in Mexico have their associates make thousands of tiny deposits in their bank accounts to avoid raising suspicion from banking authorities, a practice known as "smurfing," said the U.S. official. Mexico's banking association and the finance ministry's anti-money laundering unit declined to comment for this story. While Mexico is confiscating more drugs and assets than ever under President Felipe Calderon, forfeitures of money are still minuscule compared to even low-ball estimates of the amount of drug money that flows into Mexico. Under Calderon, authorities have confiscated about $400 million, almost none of which was seized from banks, said Ricardo Najera, a spokesman for the Attorney General's Office. Mexican bank secrecy laws make it particularly difficult to go after drug money in financial institutions, Najera said. "We can't just go in there and say 'OK, let's have a look,'" he said. "We have to trace the illicit origin of that money before we can get at those bank accounts." The U.S. Treasury has blocked only about $16 million in suspected Mexican drug assets since June 2000, a Treasury official in Washington said. The official, who asked not to be named, said the sanctions program aims to hit drug lords by breaking "their commercial and financial backbones." But freezing assets is not "the principal objective nor the key measure of success." MAFIA CAPITALISM Data on Mexican banking provides a novel way for calculating the size of the drug economy. Ibarra crunched numbers on monetary aggregates across different Mexican states and concluded that more money sits in Sinaloan banks than its legitimate economy should be generating. "It's as if two people had the same job and the same level of seniority, but one of them has twice as much savings," he said, talking about comparisons between Sinaloa and other states. Ibarra estimates cartels have laundered more than $680 million in the banks of Sinaloa -- which is a financial services backwater -- and that drug money is driving nearly 20 percent of the state's economy. Edgardo Buscaglia, an academic at Columbia University, recently scoured judicial case files and financial intelligence reports, some of which were provided by Mexican authorities. His research found organized crime's involvement in Mexican businesses had expanded sharply in the five years through 2008, with gangs now involved in most sectors of the economy.

Latin America impact empirically denied

**Hartzell 2000** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

#### US won’t be distracted away from Asia

**Xudong ‘12**

Han, professor at the PLA University of National Defense, “Risk of armed Asian conflict on the rise, but trade links rule out war,” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735653.shtml>

Island sovereignty and maritime interest disputes in the Asia-Pacific region have attracted an increasing amount of global attention recently. With external powers ready to intervene, conflicts among the relevant parties have intensified and the unrest has gotten worse. If the trend cannot be curbed, armed conflicts are more likely. With the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the global economic focus moving toward the region, the region has gradually entered into a troubled period. The US has set the region as the focus of its overseas military deployment and is taking advantage of the unrest in the region so as to adjust the power structure. Moreover, the US has carried out military exercises with relevant countries to create unrest and instigated them to confront neighboring countries. For example, over the Huangyan Island dispute, the US backs the Philippines through holding joint military exercises on island defense, as it has done with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands dispute. This is the usual tactic by the US to back relevant countries' confront actions with China. As the territorial disputes among relevant countries are closely related to core national interests, no involved parties will compromise easily. Relevant countries usually use comprehensive national strength, especially military strength, as a lever to adjust their interests. Take the dispute over the South Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan. Russia has increased its military presence on the islands and used military power to deal with Japanese provocations. Similarly, South Korea has begun to deploy its forces on Dokdo Islands, where it has disputes with Japan. At present, while China has repeatedly advocated a peaceful settlement of the Diaoyu Islands dispute, the nation has sufficient confidence and courage to face up to the challenges and safeguard its sovereignty and interests. All those conflicts mentioned above have the potential to further deteriorate. After all, international politics is the continuation and manifestation of domestic politics. Since the beginning of this year, key players in hot issues of the Asia-Pacific region all have been confronted with the sensitivity of domestic power transition. Russia had its presidential election in March. And South Korea, Japan, the US and China will soon see elections or leadership change. At such a critical moment, attitudes on safeguarding the core interests of the nation had been used as a stake to gain support, as particularly seen in Japan. Currently, the right-wing forces in Japan are promoting the campaigners to form a consistent approach over the Diaoyu Islands dispute, that is, to take an increasingly tough stance and policy. Japan hasn't made a full reflection on its war crimes. The right-wing frequently blusters about the use of force to solve the territorial disputes. This adds to the uncertainty of the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. But one certain thing is that a war is unlikely in the Asia-Pacific. Even if the parties in a dispute had a collision of forces, it wouldn't develop into full-blown war. The use of force is the highest means but the last resort to maintain core interests of nations. The current situation is totally different from other periods in history. With global economic integration, the expanding of armed conflicts will be no good to any country involved. Therefore, the relevant countries all hope the scale of conflicts could be restrained. Besides, the US is not willing to see a regional war in the Asia-Pacific. A turbulent situation without war is in its best interests. From this perspective, the Asia-Pacific region does face the potential danger of low intensity conflicts and operations. The possibility of an armed collision is on the rise, but the scale will be limited

#### Multiple factors make Asia war unlikely

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Some people look to China for economic and strategic interests while others still stick to the US. Since, as a human nature, change is not widely acceptable due to the high level of uncertainty. It is therefore logical to say that most of the regional leaders prefer to see the status quo of security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region in which US is the hub of security provision. But it is impossible to preserve the status quo since China needs to strategically outreach to the wider region in order to get necessary resources especially energy and raw materials to maintain her economic growth in the home country. It is understandable that China needs to have stable high economic growth of about 8 percent GDP growth per year for her own economic and political survival. Widening development gap and employment are the two main issues facing China. Without China, the world will not enjoy peace, stability, and development. China is the locomotive of global and regional economic development and contributes to global and regional peace and stability. It is understandable that China is struggling to break the so-called containment strategy imposed by the US since the post Cold War. Whether this tendency can lead to the greater strategic division is still unknown. Nevertheless, many observers agree that whatever changes may take place, a multi-polar world and multilateralism prevail. The reasons or logics supporting multilateralism are mainly based on the fact that no one country can really address the security issues embedded with international dimension, no one country has the capacity to adapt and adopt to new changes alone, and it needs cooperation and coordination among the nation states and relevant stakeholders including the private sector and civil societies. Large scale interstate war or armed conflict is **unthinkable** in the region due to the high level of interdependency and democratization. It is believed that economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition, globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of national and foreign policy of many governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is necessary for peace and stability in the region and those elements are **present and being improved in this region.**

#### Relations are high now and will continue to increase and problems in one area don’t have impacts outside of that area

Selee and Diaz-Cayeros 13 (Andrew and Alberto) “The Dynamics of US Mexico Relations” Mexico and the United States: the politics of partnership. 2013. Book

Yet positive factors favor prospects for more effective partnership and are likely to drive cooperation over time. First among these is the genuine interdependence of interests that underlies integration between the two countries. Everyday issues that need to be resolved – from the GM bailout to drug traffickinging to natural disasters and water shortages at the border – create a dynamic of constant engagement around highly concrete topics that policymakers on the two sides of the broder need to address. Moreover, the growing complexity of the relationship means that even when disputes arise among the two countries’ political leaders, progress continues along a number of other areas, driven by federal agencies, state, and local covernments, and nongovernmental actors. Increasingly, interactions between the two countries take place simultaneously along a wide number of different points of engagement, which are largely independent of each other and have their own particular dynamics. Progress on one does not necessarily augur progress on another; nor does failure in one area lead to failure in another. Nonetheless, progress in deepending engagement between the two countries will constantly be challenged by the persistent asymmetries that condition the relationship. The different in geopolitical realities of the two countries, the continuing intequality in average income between them and the dissimilar capacities of the two states are likely to continue to limit some efforts at greater cooperation. Recent tendencies have softened the impact of some of these asymmetries. Democraticization in Mexico has made the political systems of the two countries more similar. Increased economic and social exchanges have built ties that mitigate some of the most visible asymmetries and forced the two countries to seek solutions to shared problems. Public opinion studies show how far the two countries have gone in recognizing their mutual interest in working together despite their differences, with ordinary citizens generally far ahead of political elites. Over the long term, interdependence will force the two countries closer and complexity will allow the relationship to lay down even deeper roots along multiple points of engagement. However, asymmetry will continue to create frictions and provide a brake on progress in cooperation. The relationship between the United States and Mexico will continuiously deepen, but wil be a process fraught with tension. The countries have ceased to be distant neighbors but as yet they remain far away from being strategic partners whose relationship is guided by a common vision of mutually beneficial shared outcomes.

No terrororism or state collapse because of instab

Richard **Weitz**, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute. “Where are Latin America’s Terrorists?” 11-9-**11**

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/where-are-latin-america-s-terrorists-

The Colombian army’s killing of Alfonso Cano, head of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), will not eliminate that country’s largest guerrilla group anytime soon. But it does partly illustrate why international terrorism has not established a major presence in Latin America. Local security forces, bolstered by generous American assistance, have made the region a difficult place for foreign terrorists to set up operational cells – and other conditions also help to make Latin America less vulnerable. One reason why the FARC has survived repeated blows to its leadership is the support that it receives from various groups, perhaps including government officials, in neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela. Fortunately, this backing appears to have declined in the last year or so, following improvement in Colombia’s relations with these countries. Another factor contributing to the FARC’s survival has been its transformation over the years from a revolutionary organization into a narco-terrorist group that uses violence to support its criminal operations. Many former terrorist and insurgent groups in the region have undergone similar transformations over the last two decades. These groups, some with transnational reach, mostly engage in narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping. At worst, they sometimes employ terrorist tactics (commonly defined as violence that deliberately targets civilians). In Colombia, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) finance their operations through drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. These groups might kill civilians, but their main targets are the police and security personnel who threaten their activities. Latin America is distinctive in the recurring and broad overlap of mass movements professing revolutionary goals with transnational criminal operations. The Internet and modern social media are allowing these mass criminal movements to expand their activities beyond kidnapping, extortion, and trafficking in drugs, arms, and people, to include fraud, piracy, information theft, hacking, and sabotage. Violent mass movements remain in some Latin American countries, but, like the FARC, they are typically heavily engaged in organized crime. Drug cartels and gang warfare may ruin the lives of thousands of innocent people, but they should not be seen as equivalent to the ideological revolutionaries who used to wreak havoc in the region, or to contemporary mass terrorists. Extra-regional terrorist movements such as al-Qaeda have minimal presence in South America, with little independent operational activity and few ties to local violent movements. At most, the two types of groups might share operational insights and revenue from transnational criminal operations. Hezbollah has not conducted an attack in Latin America in almost two decades. Indigenous organized criminal movements are responsible for the most serious sources of local violence. Latin American countries generally are not a conducive environment for major terrorist groups. They lack large Muslim communities that could provide a bridgehead for Islamist extremist movements based in Africa and the Middle East. The demise of military dictatorships and the spread of democratic regimes throughout Latin America (except for Cuba) means that even severe economic, class, ethnic, and other tensions now more often manifest themselves politically, in struggles for votes and influence. No Latin American government appears to remain an active state sponsor of foreign terrorist movements. At worst, certain public officials may tolerate some foreign terrorists’ activities and neglect to act vigorously against them. More often, governments misapply anti-terrorist laws against their non-violent opponents. For example, despite significant improvement in its human-rights policies, the Chilean government has at times applied harsh anti-terrorism laws against indigenous Mapuche protesters. Indeed, Latin American terrorism is sometimes exaggerated, because governments have incentives to cite local terrorist threats to secure foreign support, such as US capacity-building funding. Just as during the Cold War, when Latin American leaders were lavished with aid for fighting communist subversion, governments seek to fight “terrorist” threats at America’s expense. Ironically, the strength of transnational criminal organizations in Latin America may act as a barrier to external terrorist groups. Extra-regional terrorists certainly have incentives to penetrate the region. Entering the US, a high-value target for some violent extremist groups, from Latin America is not difficult for skilled operatives. Extra-regional terrorist groups could also raise funds and collaborate operationally with local militants. But Latin America’s powerful transnational criminal movements, such as the gangs in Mexico that control much of the drug trafficking into the US, do not want to jeopardize their profits by associating themselves with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Supporting terrorism would merely divert time and other resources from profit-making activities, while focusing unsought US and other international attention on their criminal operations.

# 2NC

## Ethanol

**Biomanufacturing infrastructure is key to preventing bioterror**

O’Connell et al., 4 (K.P. O'Connell, P. E. Anderson, D.C. Lukens, M.H. Kim, A.S. Khan, R.G. Thompson, J.T. Park, J.J. Valdes, US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center @ University of Maryland; "Preparedness Against bioterrorism and re-emerging infectious diseases,” 2004, pg. 197)

A flexible, creative, and rapidly responsive biomanufacturing infrastructure is an essential part of an effective overall strategy for bioterrorism preparedness and biological defense. A variety of approaches and technologies are evolving to provide the capacity to bring innovations in biological threat detection, prophylaxis and therapeutics rom the laboratory bench to advanced development and ultimately to the end user and/or the marketplace. Biotechnology products, including affinity reagents, real time PCR probes and primers, molecular elements for microarray design and manufacture, therapeutic pesticides, and vaccines each have unique requirements for their production at useful scales.

#### Dutch Disease as it pertains to resource production vastly increases the risk of divides that lead to civil wars, genocide, and all forms of instability

Shaxson, Chatham House Associate Fellow, 7

[Nicholas, November 2007, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Oil, Corruption, and the Resource Curse,” jstor, p 1127-1128, Accessed 7/13/13, CB]

Consider two different hypothetical countries: Agricolia, an agricultural¶ economy, and Petroland, which depends entirely on oil. Both are divided politically¶ between North and South. When Southern Agricolia has a bumper crop, this doesn't¶ necessarily harm North Agricolia. because it doesn't take anything away from it (and¶ the North's residents may even benefit from more economic activity nearby).

Petroland is different. The total amount of oil money available for the whole¶ country this year is a given: it depends on world oil prices, the oil contracts,¶ technology, geology, financing and oil production rates, and there isn't much¶ ordinary citizens can do to change any of these variables in this economic enclave.¶ Sharing out this fixed sum of money is a zero-sum game: more for the South means¶ less for the North. Here is a classic recipe for conflict. Now, even if North and South¶ settle on a formula, the problem isn't over yet—for the Northeast will now have to¶ compete with the Northwest. And so on, down to village level—as inhabitants of¶ the Niger Delta, used to fighting for a share of local spoils, will attest. The drivers¶ of conflict spread downwards, fragmenting society at each level. For example, after¶ Nigeria's independence in 1960, the state split from three regions into four, then¶ into twelve states, then 19, 21, 31; today there are 36. This subdivision was driven¶ to a significant degree by divide-and-rule politics and the complaints of minorities¶ in each state about not getting a fair share of the 'cake'. Yet each subdivision simply¶ created new configurations, new minorities and more numerous divisions.

The economist William Easterly describes cross-country studies which highlight how ethnically diverse societies suffer, among other things, a significantly¶ higher probability of civil war and of genocide, and higher black market premiums,¶ as well as far lower economic growth, lower schooling rates and fewer paved roads.¶ He points out that economists and donors, however, have paid remarkably little¶ atrention to the effects of ethnic polarization on economic growth. Analysis needs¶ to move further, beyond seeing ethnic (and other) diversity as a static phenom-¶ enon, and understand better how polarization and social fragmentation—and the¶ perceptions of these divisions—are affected by conflicts over mineral money, and¶ how all these factors in turn impact on poverty, growth, corruption and conflict.

The divisions (and perceptions of divisions) are not always ethnic or religious.¶ One case in point would be the kind of rural/urban divide that was for years a¶ key part of UNITA rebel leader Jonas Savimbi's discourse, and an important¶ factor in the Angolan civil wars. Divisions can involve political factions that arc¶ not ethnically based. Another example would be horizontal divisions, such as that¶ which is apparent in all oil-dependent countries between the charmed elites and¶ the masses of poor. Empirically, there is plenty of evidence that more divided¶ societies perform less well than more homogeneous ones: 'Societies divided into¶ factions fight over division of the spoils,\* Easterly wrote; 'societies unified by a¶ common culture and a strong middle class create a consensus for growth—growth¶ that includes the poor." (In fact, he characterized the idea of factions acting in their¶ own interests as being chiefly responsible for bad government policies as the key¶ insight in the field of political economy.)

#### Mexican collapse causes US isolationism – kills heg

Haddick, 08, MBA Illinois, managing ed. Small Wars Journal, fmr. Marine officer, [Robert Haddick, MBA Illinois, managing ed. Small Wars Journal, fmr. Marine officer, 12-21-2008, “Now that would change everything,” <http://westhawk.blogspot.com/2008/12/now-that-would-change-everything.html>

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and failing states that has received relatively little attention, namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods. The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen - in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the epicenter of the ensuing civil war. In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used. The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone. Yes, the “rapid collapse” of Mexico would change everything with respect to the global security environment. Such a collapse would have enormous humanitarian, constitutional, economic, cultural, and security implications for the U.S. It would seem the U.S. federal government, indeed American society at large, would have little ability to focus serious attention on much else in the world. The hypothetical collapse of Pakistan is a scenario that has already been well discussed. In the worst case, the U.S. would be able to isolate itself from most effects emanating from south Asia. However, there would be no running from a Mexican collapse.

## Trade

We’ll concede that trade is good

Protectionism is low now and won’t cause the US to limit out everything

AFf can’t solve all instances of

#### Extend the NIPCC evidence – warming doesn’t cause extinction

#### a. Periods of warming have occurred before with no impact on flora or fauna

#### b. There is no empirical basis for the harmful aspects of warming

#### c. Species have a biotic resistance to temperature fluctuations

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Low threshold for our defense—uncertainty disproves the need for action, takes out their impacts, and means you should vote neg on presumption

Dennis, PhD physics – UC Santa Barbara, senior fellow – Center for Industrial Progress, 3/16/’12

(Eric, “What the “Skeptics” of Climate Catastrophe are Skeptical Of: Nordhaus Reconsidered,” <http://www.masterresource.org/2012/03/what-the-skeptics-are-skeptical-of/>)

To say that modeling the climate for long-term predictions is difficult given the current state of climate science is like saying that it would be difficult for your five-year-old son to build a 400 horsepower car from re-purposed Toys ‘R’ Us purchases. Imagine that he comes to you with pages and pages of plans he’s sketched out in crayon. The “car” will cost $22,827.35 worth of toys. Why wouldn’t you reach for your credit card? Is that because you’re against teaching kids engineering? Is it because his sworn enemy, your daughter, is paying you off? Or perhaps it’s because this project is obviously beyond the capability of a five-year-old, and that his crayon schematics don’t offer convincing evidence that he is in fact the kind of once-in-a-generation prodigy who could somehow pull it off. If one understands how monumental an undertaking it would be to produce a sound climate model, one can see that today’s climate modelers are making assertions no less implausible than our five-year old’s fantasy. In physics it is generally possible to exactly predict the behavior of systems involving two independent bodies, whether planets interacting through gravity or elementary particles through the electromagnetic field. More bodies means no exact solution to the dynamical equations and a zoo of different approximations, usually requiring computational simulation, which takes more and more time as the number of bodies being simulated increases. Indeed the computation time generally grows exponentially with the number of bodies. The global climate system comprises an astronomical number (at least billions) of effectively independent “bodies,” which is to say of isolatable, relatively uniform chunks of air, ocean, and earth. Their interactions span the complexity spectrum, from the mechanical push-and-pull of an ocean current to the lesser-known dynamics of cloud formation to intricate, biological mechanisms like plant growth and respiration that have evolved over billions of years. Solving this kind of complex system is outside the realm of controlled approximations and reasonable estimates. It’s in the realm of random stabs, on any objective assessment of our current scientific powers. Since attempts to model this system are the basis of claims for catastrophic global warming, the evidence we need to consider pertains to whether or not such models are capturing enough of the detailed mess of forces that actually drives the climate. Many different climate processes affect the energy balance between the earth and outer-space and thus affect temperatures on the Earth. One such process is the greenhouse effect, by which CO2 and other gases trap some extra solar energy in the atmosphere and convert it into heat. It is widely acknowledged that the CO2-linked greenhouse effect itself can produce only a modest warming going forward because the incremental warming produced by each extra liter of CO2 gets smaller and smaller as more CO2 is added. The catastrophist projections are based on the idea that this modest warming will trigger an entirely separate set of feedback mechanisms that will multiply the warming many times. For instance warming is projected to increase ambient levels of water vapor, itself a greenhouse gas; melting ice will expose more earth or open water, which tend to absorb more solar energy as heat; temperature-linked changes in cloud patterns affect how much solar energy gets reflected back to space or back to the Earth. There are also negative feedbacks, meaning processes that come into play due to warming, or to CO2 increases, that wind up counteracting that warming. Examples include enhanced re-radiation of energy back into space at higher temperatures, increased absorption of CO2 into the oceans, and increased quantities of organic matter capturing CO2. Indeed some supposedly positive feedbacks, like certain cloud effects, may turn out actually to be negative ones. Moreover, nature does not simply provide us with a list of all the relevant feedbacks, or climate processes in general. There is no systematic procedure by which the set of processes included in current climate models are picked out from the catalogue of all possible such processes. The procedure is simply for modelers to engage their own imaginations, given our current knowledge, to conceive possible effects and gather evidence to confirm or falsify them. How many known ones have been intentionally discarded due to a lack of knowledge and evidence about how to incorporate them? How many have just not been thought of to date? In a certain sense, this is the nature of any scientific theory. But this is why such theories have to produce specific, detailed predictions, confirmed by observation, to show that they have captured the relevant causal factors. Apart from this, there is a lot of room here for the ultimate outcome of the models to be controlled by ideological predispositions—like that, of all the underlying drivers, the decisive one just happens to be CO2, the one with a clear link to the functioning of modern, industrial capitalism. What would be a rational response when your five-year-old car enthusiast presents you with his crayon plans, protesting that he’s also proven his case by putting together a scale model in Legos? First you might point out that while his plans are impressive for a boy his age, it’s rarely the case that reality works out just like a priori plans and models suggest. Rather than setting him loose at toysrus.com with your credit card, you might suggest he start off with a scaled-down project, like an RC kit. Then, if that’s a success, maybe an introduction to simple wood and then metal work. As he gets older and proves himself at each stage, he could move on to machine shop projects, welding, and an apprenticeship with a real car mechanic. This kind of demonstrated, step-by-step progress is how legitimate inventions, and inventors, are made. At the end of the process, they no longer agitate for sizable investments on the basis of their original crayon plans. And such demonstrated, step-by-step progress is exactly what a reasonable person ought to demand from the global warming catastrophists. Not mere simulations, generated by model code that they control and have played with for years. Since the odds are so small, a priori, that they have actually cracked the excruciatingly complicated problem of global climate prediction, we need dramatic positive evidence. Lesser evidence is powerless to overcome the overwhelming odds against being able to delicately sort out the mess of climate drivers and feedbacks.The catastrophists need to demonstrate their methodology by applying it to smaller problems whose outcomes we don’t have to wait a century for. They need to derive unambiguous, detailed predictions for these outcomes and see them borne out. By “detailed” I mean predictions of not just a single number, like a cumulative warming trend, that could just be accidentally correct—and they’re not even getting predictions on these simpler metrics right. I mean predictions of a more intricate, unaccidental nature. For instance, climate models predict a detailed pattern of warming that occurs at different rates in different parts of the globe and, importantly, at different altitudes in the atmosphere. But when we look in actual climate data for the specific, altitude-dependent warming signature produced by these models, we find something entirely different. And that’s only half the problem. Before we can test models, we need this historical climate data to be accurate in order for the comparison to mean anything. Even for the one central climate variable, global average temperature, the reconstructed data is fraught with uncertainties and scientific misconduct. What has always to be kept in mind on these issues, is (i) the massive complexity of the problem the catastrophist modelers are claiming to have solved relative to the current state of climate science, and (ii) what this implies about the onus of proof. Their claim is to have accomplished a scientific miracle with tools that by any reasonable analysis are far from capable of the task. Absent shocking evidence of success on their part, the conclusion to draw is not: catastrophic global warming has just moderate odds of occurring. The conclusion is that these models bear as much relationship to reality as your son’s crayon plans bear to a real car. And suggestions about how to transform the entire world economy based on these models should be treated accordingly.

#### No impact to warming

**Mendelsohn**, professor of forestry and environmental studies – Yale, **‘9**

(Robert O., “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>)

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

# 1NR

## Trade Cred

**Disease causes extinction**

-zoonosis (spreading from animals to humans) makes spread unpredictable and extremely likely

-outbreak is nearly inevitable within five years – it will begin among poor populations

-early detection is key because spread is fast

-globalization makes spread very fast

-cytokine storms (positive feedback loops where a virus initiates an immune system overreaction that causes death through fever and vomiting – this doesn’t kill the disease but only the host which makes burnout theory moot)

-population growth makes it likely

-we aren’t genetically diverse enough for a sustainable population to be immune

-increased deforestation and urban expansion brings people into areas with higher probability of spread

-previous zoonotic viruses couldn’t spread by air – flu could be spread by air

-symptoms won’t appear until the host is infectious

-only detection solves

**Naish 12** (John Naish, writer for Daily Mail, citing John Oxford, professor of virology at Queen Mary’s School of Medicine and Dentistry, Scientific Director of Retroscreen Virology Ltd, considered to be the leading expert on disease and viral outbreaks, 10-14-12, “The Armageddon virus: Why experts fear a disease that leaps from animals to humans could devastate mankind in the next five years,” <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2217774/The-Armageddon-virus-Why-experts-fear-disease-leaps-animals-humans-devastate-mankind-years.html>) gz

When the Health Protection Agency warned the world of this newly- emerging virus last month, it ignited a stark fear among medical experts.¶ Could this be the next bird flu, or even the next ‘Spanish flu’ — the world’s biggest pandemic, which claimed between 50 million and 100 million lives across the globe from 1918 to 1919?¶ In all these outbreaks, the virus responsible came from an animal. Analysts now believe that the Spanish flu pandemic originated from a wild aquatic bird.¶ The terrifying fact is that viruses that manage to jump to us from animals — called **zoonoses** — can wreak havoc because of their astonishing ability to catch us on the hop and spread rapidly through the population when we least expect it. ¶ One leading British virologist, Professor John Oxford at Queen Mary Hospital, University of London, and a world authority on epidemics, warns that we must expect an animal-originated pandemic to hit the world within **the next five years**, with potentially **cataclysmic effects** on the human race.¶ Such a contagion, he believes, will be a new strain of super-flu, a highly infectious virus that may originate in some far-flung backwater of Asia or Africa, and be contracted by one person from a wild animal or domestic beast, such as a chicken or pig. ¶ By the time the first victim has succumbed to this unknown, unsuspected new illness, they will have spread it by coughs and sneezes to family, friends, and all those gathered anxiously around them.¶ Thanks to our crowded, hyper-connected world, **this doomsday virus will already have begun crossing the globe by air, rail, road and sea** before even the best brains in medicine have begun to chisel at its genetic secrets. Before it even has a name, it will have started to cut its lethal swathe through the world’s population.¶ If this new virus follows the pattern of the pandemic of 1918-1919, it will cruelly reap mass harvests of young and fit people. ¶ They die because of something called a ‘**cytokine storm’** — a vast overreaction of their strong and efficient immune systems that is prompted by the virus.¶ This uncontrolled response burns them with a fever and wracks their bodies with nausea and massive fatigue. The hyper-activated immune system actually **kills the person, rather than killing the super-virus**.¶ Professor Oxford bases his prediction on historical patterns. ¶ The past century has certainly provided us with many disturbing precedents. For example, the 2003 global outbreak of Sars, the severe acute respiratory syndrome that killed nearly 1,000 people, was transmitted to humans from Asian civet cats in China.¶ In November 2002, it first spread among people working at a live animal market in the southern Guangdong province, where civets were being sold. ¶ Nowadays, the threat from such zoonoses is far greater than ever, thanks to modern **technology** and human **population growth**. Mass transport such as airliners can quickly fan outbreaks of newly- emerging zoonoses into deadly global wildfires. ¶ The Sars virus was spread when a Chinese professor of respiratory medicine treating people with the syndrome fell ill when he travelled to Hong Kong, carrying the virus with him. ¶ By February 2003, it had covered the world by hitching easy lifts with airline passengers. Between March and July 2003, some 8,400 probable cases of Sars had been reported in 32 countries.¶ It is a similar story with H1N1 swine flu, the 2009 influenza pandemic that infected hundreds of millions throughout the world. It is now believed to have originated in herds of pigs in Mexico before infecting humans who boarded flights to myriad destinations. ¶ Once these stowaway viruses get off the plane, they don’t have to learn a new language or new local customs. ¶ Genetically, **we humans are not very diverse**; an epidemic that can kill people in one part of the world can kill them in any other just as easily. ¶ On top of this, our risk of catching such deadly contagions from wild animals is growing massively, thanks to humankind’s relentless **encroachment into the world’s jungles and rainforests**, where we increasingly come into contact for the first time with unknown viral killers that have been evolving and incubating in wild creatures for millennia.¶ This month, an international research team announced it had identified an entirely new African virus that killed two teenagers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009. ¶ The virus induced acute hemorrhagic fever, which causes catastrophic widespread bleeding from the eyes, ears, nose and mouth, and can kill in days.¶ A 15-year-old boy and a 13-year-old girl who attended the same school both fell ill suddenly and succumbed rapidly. A week after the girl’s death, a nurse who cared for her developed similar symptoms. He only narrowly survived.¶ The new microbe is named Bas-Congo virus (BASV), after the province where its three victims lived. It belongs to a family of viruses known as rhabdoviruses, which includes rabies. ¶ A report in the journal PLoS Pathogens says the virus probably originated in local wildlife and was passed to humans through insect bites or some other as-yet unidentified means. ¶ There are plenty of other new viral candidates waiting in the wings, guts, breath and blood of animals around us. You can, for example, catch leprosy from armadillos, which carry the virus in their shells and are responsible for a third of leprosy cases in the U.S. ¶ Horses can transmit the Hendra virus, which can cause lethal respiratory and neurological disease in people. ¶ In a new book that should give us all pause for thought, award-winning U.S. natural history writer David Quammen points to a host of animal-derived infections that now claim lives with unprecedented regularity. The trend can only get worse, he warns.¶ Quammen highlights the Ebola fever virus, which first struck in Zaire in 1976. The virus’s power is terrifying, with fatality rates as high as 90 per cent. The latest mass outbreak of the virus, in the Congo last month, is reported to have killed 36 people out of 81 suspected cases.¶ According to Quammen, Ebola probably originated in bats. The bats then infected African apes, quite probably through the apes coming into contact with bat droppings. The virus then infected local hunters who had eaten the apes as bushmeat. ¶ Quammen believes a similar pattern occurred with the HIV virus, which probably originated in a single chimpanzee in Cameroon. ¶ Studies of the virus’s genes suggest it may have first evolved as early as 1908. It was not until the Sixties that it appeared in humans, in big African cities. By the Eighties, it was spreading by airlines to America. Since then, Aids has killed around 30 million people and infected another 33 million.¶ There is one mercy with Ebola and HIV. They cannot be transmitted by coughs and sneezes. ‘Ebola is transmissible from human to human through direct contact with bodily fluids. It can be stopped by preventing such contact,’ Quammen explains. ¶ ‘If HIV could be transmitted by air, you and I might already be dead. If the rabies virus — another **zoonosis — could be transmitted by air**, it would be the most horrific pathogen on the planet.’¶ Viruses such as Ebola have another limitation, on top of their method of transmission. They kill and incapacitate people too quickly. In order to spread into pandemics, zoonoses need their human hosts to be both infectious and alive for as long as possible, so that the virus can keep casting its deadly tentacles across the world’s population.¶ But there is one zoonosis that can do all the right (or wrong) things. It is our old adversary, flu. It is easily transmitted through the air, via sneezes and coughs. ¶ Sars can do this, too. But flu has a further advantage. As Quammen points out: ‘With Sars, symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. ¶ ‘That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. But with influenza and many other diseases, **the order is reversed**.’¶ Someone who has an infectious case of a new and potentially lethal strain of flu can be walking about innocently spluttering it over everyone around them for days before they become incapacitated.¶ Such reasons lead Professor Oxford, a world authority on epidemics, to warn that a new global pandemic of animal-derived flu is **inevitable**. And, he says, the clock is ticking fast.¶ Professor Oxford’s warning is as stark as it is certain: ‘I think it is inevitable that we will have another big global outbreak of flu,’ he says. ‘We should plan for one emerging in 2017-2018.’¶ But are we adequately prepared to cope? ¶ Professor Oxford warns that **vigilant surveillance** is the only real answer that we have. ¶ ‘New flu strains are a day-to-day problem and we have to be very careful to keep on top of them,’ he says. ¶ ‘We now have scientific processes enabling us to quickly identify the genome of the virus behind a new illness, so that we know what we are dealing with. The best we can do after that is to develop and stockpile vaccines and antiviral drugs that can fight new strains that we see emerging.’¶ But the Professor is worried our politicians are not taking this certainty of mass death seriously enough. ¶ Such laxity could come at a human cost so unprecedentedly high that it would amount to criminal negligence. The race against newly-emerging animal-derived diseases is one that we have to win every time. A pandemic virus needs to win only once and it could be the **end of humankind**.

#### **Trade increases S02**

Jean-Marie **Grether** 1/29/**7**, University of Neuchâte, “Is trade bad for the environment? Decomposing world-wide SO2 emissions 1990-2000”

This paper proposes three simple exercises to estimate the impact of trade on worldwide SO2 emissions over the 1990-2000 period. Combining three emission data sources (IPPS, EDGAR and Stern, (2006)) with sectoral output and employment data, we construct a database with time, country and sector-speciﬁc emission coeﬃcients. A ﬁrst growth decomposition exercise shows that the scale and technique eﬀects are the main driving force behind global changes in SO2 emissions.

#### **SO2 causes more warming specifically in the Arctic which is key – also causes acid rain**

Gosselin, 5/4/12 - Associate Degree in Civil Engineering at Vermont Technical College and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Arizona in Tucson “ Russian Sulfur Dioxide May Be The Cause Of Arctic Warming,” NoTricksZone, <http://notrickszone.com/2012/05/04/russian-sulfur-dioxide-may-be-the-cause-of-arctic-warming/>, //JPL)

We know that SO2 from industry and fossil fueled power plants form smogs and low clouds that produce acid rain down wind from the sources. We know what damage acid rain can do when the acid content is high enough to harm plant life. But little attention has been paid to the climate effects of the smogs themselves. We know that low clouds and fogs keep surface temperatures from falling at night, as well as keeping surface temperatures from rising during daylight. We know that in the polar regions in winter it is night all the time. Now put those things together. In the Arctic, in winter, smogs and low clouds caused by SO2 will trap heat below them 24 hours a day, and in the spring will prevent sunlight from reaching and warming the surface. On the Arctic Ocean, this will delay both freezing in the winter and melting in the spring. We can see clearly that the freeze-up in the Arctic has been delayed in recent years compared to the 1979 to 2006 average. Because the freeze-up is delayed, there is less ice to thaw in the spring, so that delay is less obvious, except that the ice minimum is also delayed compared to the average. Now we get to why? First, we look at two temperature anomaly maps of the Arctic. Norilsk is the location of the world’s largest nickel mine. They also recover copper, cobalt, platinum, and palladium. Nearby, coal is mined to support the power needs of the city (130,000 population), the mine, and the smelter operations. SO2 emissions are about one million metric tons per year. This one location is responsible for 1% of all the SO2 emissions in the world, 10% of all of Europe’s emissions. CNN reports that there is not a single living tree within 48 kilometers (30 miles) of the nickel smelter. 2,832 square kilometers (1093 square miles) of forest have been killed, and another 5371 square kilometers (2073 square miles) have been damaged. For a full report on the damage read this pdf document. Norilsk Mining has other smelters on the Kola Peninsula very close to the Norwegian border. They also emit large amounts of SO2. Both locations are well above the Arctic Circle. All these emissions are within a very sensitive part of the Earth: the Arctic. During the winter, the winds in the Arctic are variable, depending on the position of the Arctic front. The winds alternate between blowing to and from the land, moving any pollution over the Arctic Ocean or inland. In Figure 2b, in March, the pollution from Norilsk was moving over the ocean much of the time. You can see the ebb and flow of the winds as they moved the sea ice in an animation of the last year here (from NRL). Normally, SO2 is not a greenhouse gas, but it is in the dark of winter in the Arctic. In combination with water vapor, which is a greenhouse gas, it produces smog and low clouds that reflect heat back to the surface when it is dark, and upward into space when the sun shines. This distorts the melting and freezing patterns resulting in less ice in the Arctic Ocean. Yes, the reduction in ice in the Arctic is anthropogenic, with a Russian accent. One thing people don’t know is that the platinum/palladium used in in automotive catalytic converters comes from Norilsk. We are simply moving the pollution from a distributed source, automobiles, to a concentrated source in Siberia. We are all responsible for Arctic warming.

#### **It’s try or die—warming releases methane from the tundra causing extinction**

John Atcheson 12/15/13, former Department of Energy senior policy analyst and geologist, has held a variety of policy positions in several federal government agencies “Ticking Time Bomb,”

The Arctic Council's recent report on the effects of global warming in the far north paints a grim picture: global floods, extinction of polar bears and other marine mammals, collapsed fisheries. But it ignored a ticking time bomb buried in the Arctic tundra. There are enormous quantities of naturally occurring greenhouse gasses trapped in ice-like structures in the cold northern muds and at the bottom of the seas. These ices, called clathrates, contain 3,000 times as much methane as is in the atmosphere. Methane is more than 20 times as strong a greenhouse gas as carbon dioxide. Now here's the scary part. A temperature increase of merely a few degrees would cause these gases to volatilize and "burp" into the atmosphere, which would further raise temperatures, which would release yet more methane, heating the Earth and seas further, and so on. There's 400 gigatons of methane locked in the frozen arctic tundra - enough to [start](http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1215-24.htm) this chain reaction - and the kind of warming the Arctic Council predicts is sufficient to melt the clathrates and release these greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Once triggered, this cycle could result in runaway [global warming the](http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1215-24.htm) likes of which even the most pessimistic doomsayers aren't talking about. An apocalyptic fantasy concocted by hysterical environmentalists? Unfortunately, no. Strong geologic evidence suggests something similar has happened at least twice before. The most recent of these catastrophes occurred about 55 million years ago in what geologists call the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), when methane burps caused rapid warming and massive die-offs, disrupting the climate for more than 100,000 years. The granddaddy of these catastrophes occurred 251 million years ago, at the end of the Permian period, when a series of methane burps came close to wiping out all life on Earth. More than 94 percent of the marine species present in the fossil record disappeared suddenly as oxygen levels plummeted and life teetered on the verge of extinction. Over the ensuing 500,000 years, a few species struggled to gain a foothold in the hostile environment. It took 20 million to 30 million years for even rudimentary coral reefs to re-establish themselves and for forests to regrow. In some areas, it took more than 100 million years for ecosystems to reach their former [healthy](http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1215-24.htm) diversity. Geologist Michael J. Benton lays out the scientific evidence for this epochal tragedy in a recent book, [When Life Nearly Died: The Greatest Mass Extinction of All Time](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/050005116X/commondreams-20/ref=nosim). As with the PETM, greenhouse gases, mostly carbon dioxide from increased volcanic activity, warmed the earth and seas enough to release massive amounts of methane from these sensitive clathrates, setting off a runaway greenhouse effect. The cause of all this havoc? In both cases, a temperature increase of about 10.8 [degrees](http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1215-24.htm) Fahrenheit, about the upper range for the average global increase today's models predict can be expected from burning fossil fuels by 2100. But these models could be the tail wagging the dog since they don't add in the effect of burps from warming gas hydrates. Worse, as the Arctic Council found, the highest temperature increases from human greenhouse gas emissions will occur in the arctic regions - an area rich in these unstable clathrates. If we trigger this runaway release of methane, there's no turning back. No do-overs. Once it starts, it's likely to play out all the way.

**Free trade hurts small farms and agriculture—displaces domestic products**

Steve **Suppan** **NO DATE** CITED, works at Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, “ Analysis of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) Concerning Agriculture”

[<http://www.mofga.org/Default.aspx?tabid=441>]

To date, trade liberalization policies have led to declining farm prices and income for small-scale farmers both in the United States and abroad. Liberalized trade policies are also linked to increased scale in farm production, increased competition and displacement of small-scale farmers in developing countries. These trends negatively impact sustainable farming practices. Regulations and standards concerning organic labeling, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and environmental protection may be overruled by international tribunals created through trade agreements such as CAFTA, the FTAA, bilateral trade and WTO agreements. MOFGA supports the goal of standing in solidarity with farmers and farm organizations across the United States and around the world in calling for a more democratic process to determine the parameters governing both international trade and the domestic policies that promote international trade in agriculture. To that end, we support: trade policies that enhance the ability of small-scale and sustainable farmers to make a living wage; diversity in farm production and in local cultures as well as the right and ability of local communities to set standards for the products they produce and consume; socially and economically responsible trade in agriculture, including Fair Trade that ensures farmers living wages for the fruits of their labor; the efforts of the Commission established by the Maine Trade, Jobs and Democracy Act (LD1815) in the last legislative session. This Commission, composed of our legislators and citizens, is examining the impacts of "Free Trade" Agreements to our economy, jobs, and democracy and will specifically examine the impacts to farms in Maine. Further we: will empower one of our members, if one so chooses, to be an official representative to the newly forming Maine Fair Trade Coalition as an advocate for the interests of small-scale, organic, and sustainable farmers in international trade issues; stand in Solidarity with farmers in El Salvador and in other parts of the developing world to reject the FTAA and CAFTA in their current forms as destructive to the lives and livelihoods of family farmers world-wide; seek to provide education to the public about trade issues and their impact to small-scale farmers world-wide in order to empower thedemocratic process. \*. CCR (Association of Communities for the Development of Chalatenango) is the organizing arm of its parent organization, CRIPTES, and its mission is: "to promote and consolidate the organization, education, and mobilization of rural communities, and to stimulate and strengthen participation of women, men, and youth in community organizing and local government which ultimately contributes to social, political, economic, and cultural transformation." CCR works in partnership with CORDES (Foundation for the Communal Cooperation and Development of El Salvador) whose mission is: "to promote and strengthen sustainable economic development with equity in rural and sub-urban areas which socially, economically, and politically have been neglected." Why should MOFGA object to CAFTA, the FTAA, NAFTA, and similar international trade agreements? What happens to small-scale farmers when barriers to international trade are eliminated? Overall, international trade agreements benefit agribusiness to the detriment of small-scale farmers. According to the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC): "Current US agriculture policy allows agriculture products to be sold on the international market far below their cost of production which benefits mainly agribusiness corporations and very large farming operations. These policies allow these large players to buy cheap and sell across international borders wherever they can make the most profit, while underselling local farmers both in the U.S. and abroad, and intensifying rates of poverty since family farmers worldwide are unable to compete." Small-scale farmers in the U.S. do not benefit from gaining access to other countries' markets. Trade agreements are written for business interests, and put the primary focus of discussions on increasing PROFITS for US corporations, and decreasing PRICES for consumers. Agribusinesses can increase profits even while commodity prices decline by dumping cheap products in other countries while continuing to profit from subsidies. This hurts small-scale farmers in other countries, and does not benefit small-scale farmers in the U.S. Small-scale farmers in the U.S. and around the world are hurt by downward price pressures when transnational agribusiness corporations move products freely across countries' borders. How many times have you heard that local, organic food is "expensive"? Probably many. But are small-scale organic farmers making living wages? No. American consumers and our society are trained by artificially low food prices, set by subsidized agribusiness. According to the NFFC, "more than 40% of net income of agriculture in the U.S. comes from the federal government in the form of direct subsidies, an attempt to make up for low commodity prices." These artificially low prices make it impossible for small-scale American farmers to compete with agribusiness in terms of price - even when food comes long distances from factory farms to supermarkets, with many middlemen taking a cut. International trade agreements exacerbate this problem worldwide by creating incentives for agribusiness to buy commodities cheaply from farmers in one country and sell them at prices lower than local farmers can afford in another country. U.S. agribusiness can also "dump" cheap products (like soybeans) on other countries. A farmer from Thailand who visited Maine last year asked "How can the U.S. grow soybeans, send them half-way around the world to Thailand, and still sell them in our markets for prices too low for us to compete?"

**Small farms prevent extinction**

**Altieri 8**

[Professor of agroecology @ University of California, Berkeley. [Miguel Altieri (President, Sociedad Cientifica LatinoAmericana de Agroecologia (SOCLA), “Small farms as a planetary ecological asset: Five key reasons why we should support the revitalization of small farms in the Global South,” Food First, Posted May 9th, 2008, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2115]

The Via Campesina has long argued that farmers need land to produce food for their own communities and for their country and for this reason has advocated for genuine agrarian reforms to access and control land, water, agrobiodiversity, etc, which are of central importance for communities to be able to meet growing food demands. The Via Campesina believes that in order to protect livelihoods, jobs, people's food security and health, as well as the environment, food production has to remain in the hands of small- scale sustainable farmers and cannot be left under the control of large agribusiness companies or supermarket chains. Only by changing the export-led, free-trade based, industrial agriculture model of large farms can the downward spiral of poverty, low wages, rural-urban migration, hunger and environmental degradation be halted. Social rural movements embrace the concept of food sovereignty as an alternative to the neo-liberal approach that puts its faith in inequitable international trade to solve the world’s food problem. Instead, food sovereignty focuses on local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty and farmer to farmer networks. This global movement, the Via Campesina, has recently brought their message to the North, partly to gain the support of foundations and consumers, as political pressure from a wealthier public that increasingly depends on unique food products from the South marketed via organic, fair trade, or slow food channels could marshal the sufficient political will to curb the expansion of biofuels, transgenic crops and agro-exports, and put an end to subsidies to industrial farming and dumping practices that hurt small farmers in the South. But can these arguments really captivate the attention and support of northern consumers and philanthropists? Or is there a need for a different argument—one that emphasizes that the very quality of life and food security of the populations in the North depends not only on the food products, but in the ecological services provided by small farms of the South. In fact, it is herein argued that the functions performed by small farming systems still prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin America—in the post-peak oil era that humanity is entering—comprise an ecological asset for humankind and planetary survival. In fact, in an era of escalating fuel and food costs, climate change, environmental degradation, GMO pollution and corporate- dominated food systems, small, biodiverse, agroecologically managed farms in the Global South are the only viable form of agriculture that will feed the world under the new ecological and economic scenario. There are at last five reasons why it is in the interest of Northern consumers to support the cause and struggle of small farmers in the South: 1. Small farmers are key for the world’s food security While 91% of the planet’s 1.5 billion hectares of agricultural land are increasingly being devoted to agro-export crops, biofuels and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle, millions of small farmers in the Global South still produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planet’s rural and urban populations. In Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for domestic consumption. Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing 80 percent of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that Africa now imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms below 2 hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food crops with virtually no or little use of fertilizers and improved seed. In Asia, the majority of more than 200 million rice farmers, few farm more than 2 hectares of rice make up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Small increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the world´s staple crops will have far more impact on food availability at the local and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high tech solutions as genetically modified seeds. 2.Small farms are more productive and resource conserving than large-scale monocultures Although the conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is considered rather than yield from a single crop. Integrated farming systems in which the small-scale farmer produces grains, fruits, vegetables, fodder, and animal products out-produce yield per unit of single crops such as corn (monocultures) on large-scale farms. A large farm may produce more corn per hectare than a small farm in which the corn is grown as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, potato, and fodder. In polycultures developed by smallholders, productivity, in terms of harvestable products, per unit area is higher than under sole cropping with the same level of management. Yield advantages range from 20 percent to 60 percent, because polycultures reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases, and make more efficient use of the available resources of water, light and nutrients. In overall output, the diversified farm produces much more food, even if measured in dollars. In the USA, data shows that the smallest two hectare farms produced $15,104 per hectare and netted about $2,902 per acre. The largest farms, averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare and netted about $52 per hectare. Not only do small to medium sized farms exhibit higher yields than conventional farms, but do so with much lower negative impact on the environment. Small farms are ‘multi-functional’– more productive, more efficient, and contribute more to economic development than do large farms. Communities surrounded by many small farms have healthier economies than do communities surrounded by depopulated, large mechanized farms. Small farmers also take better care of natural resources, including reducing soil erosion and conserving biodiversity. The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed to the more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other agricultural resources by small farmers. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global South based on productive small-scale farming will allow the people of the South to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of migration. And as population continues to grow and the amount of farmland and water available to each person continues to shrink, a small farm structure may become central to feeding the planet, especially when large- scale agriculture devotes itself to feeding car tanks. 3. Small traditional and biodiverse farms are models of sustainability Despite the onslaught of industrial farming, the persistence of thousands of hectares under traditional agricultural management documents a successful indigenous agricultural strategy of adaptability and resiliency. These microcosms of traditional agriculture that have stood the test of time, and that can still be found almost untouched since 4 thousand years in the Andes, MesoAmerica, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, offer promising models of sustainability as they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and sustain year-round yields even under marginal environmental conditions. The local knowledge accumulated during millennia and the forms of agriculture and agrobiodiversity that this wisdom has nurtured, comprise a Neolithic legacy embedded with ecological and cultural resources of fundamental value for the future of humankind. Recent research suggests that many small farmers cope and even prepare for climate change, minimizing crop failure through increased use of drought tolerant local varieties, water harvesting, mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding, agroforestry and a series of other traditional techniques. Surveys conducted in hillsides after Hurricane Mitch in Central America showed that farmers using sustainable practices such as “mucuna” cover crops, intercropping, and agroforestry suffered less “damage” than their conventional neighbors. The study spanning 360 communities and 24 departments in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala showed that diversified plots had 20% to 40% more topsoil, greater soil moisture, less erosion, and experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbors. This demonstrates that a re-evaluation of indigenous technology can serve as a key source of information on adaptive capacity and resilient capabilities exhibited by small farms—features of strategic importance for world farmers to cope with climatic change. In addition, indigenous technologies often reflect a worldview and an understanding of our relationship to the natural world that is more realistic and more sustainable that those of our Western European heritage. 4. Small farms represent a sanctuary of GMO-free agrobiodiversity In general, traditional small scale farmers grow a wide variety of cultivars . Many of these plants are landraces grown from seed passed down from generation to generation, more genetically heterogeneous than modern cultivars, and thus offering greater defenses against vulnerability and enhancing harvest security in the midst of diseases, pests, droughts and other stresses. In a worldwide survey of crop varietal diversity on farms involving 27 crops, scientists found that considerable crop genetic diversity continues to be maintained on farms in the form of traditional crop varieties, especially of major staple crops. In most cases, farmers maintain diversity as an insurance to meet future environmental change or social and economic needs. Many researchers have concluded that this varietal richness enhances productivity and reduces yield variability. For example, studies by plant pathologists provide evidence that mixing of crop species and or varieties can delay the onset of diseases by reducing the spread of disease carrying spores, and by modifying environmental conditions so that they are less favorable to the spread of certain pathogens. Recent research in China, where four different mixtures of rice varieties grown by farmers from fifteen different townships over 3000 hectares, suffered 44% less blast incidence and exhibited 89% greater yield than homogeneous fields without the need to use chemicals. It is possible that traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities which may not be important to farmers (Jordan, 2001). Under this scenario, risk could increase and farmers would lose their ability to adapt to changing biophysical environments and increase their success with relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs while supporting their communities’ food security. Although there is a high probability that the introduction of transgenic crops will enter centers of genetic diversity, it is crucial to protect areas of peasant agriculture free of contamination from GMO crops, as traits important to indigenous farmers (resistance to drought, food or fodder quality, maturity, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, taste or cooking properties, compatibility with household labor conditions, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities (i.e. herbicide resistance) which are of no importance to farmers who don’t use agrochemicals . Under this scenario risk will increase and farmers will lose their ability to produce relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs under changing biophysical environments. The social impacts of local crop shortfalls, resulting from changes in the genetic integrity of local varieties due to genetic pollution, can be considerable in the margins of the Global South. Maintaining pools of genetic diversity, geographically isolated from any possibility of cross fertilization or genetic pollution from uniform transgenic crops will create “islands” of intact germplasm which will act as extant safeguards against potential ecological failure derived from the second green revolution increasingly being imposed with programs such as the Gates-Rockefeller AGRA in Africa. These genetic sanctuary islands will serve as the only source of GMO-free seeds that will be needed to repopulate the organic farms in the North inevitably contaminated by the advance of transgenic agriculture. The small farmers and indigenous communities of the Global South, with the help of scientists and NGOs, can continue to create and guard biological and genetic diversity that has enriched the food culture of the whole planet. 5. Small farms cool the climate While industrial agriculture contributes directly to climate change through no less than one third of total emissions of the major greenhouse gases — Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), small, biodiverse organic farms have the opposite effect by sequestering more carbon in soils**.** Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials that absorb and sequester carbon better than soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers have suggested that the conversion of 10,000 small- to medium-sized farms to organic production would store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road. Further climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less fossil fuel in comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use, relying instead on organic manures, legume-based rotations, and diversity schemes to enhance beneficial insects. Farmers who live in rural communities near cities and towns and are linked to local markets, avoid the energy wasted and the gas emissions associated with transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles. Conclusions The great advantage of small farming systems is their high levels of agrobidoversity arranged in the form of variety mixtures, polycultures, crop-livestock combinations and/or agroforestry patterns. Modeling new agroecosystems using such diversified designs are extremely valuable to farmers whose systems are collapsing due to debt, pesticide use, transgenic treadmills, or climate change. Such diverse systems buffer against natural or human-induced variations in production conditions. There is much to learn from indigenous modes of production, as these systems have a strong ecological basis, maintain valuable genetic diversity, and lead to regeneration and preservation of biodiversity and natural resources. Traditional methods are particularly instructive because they provide a long-term perspective on successful agricultural management under conditions of climatic variability. Organized social rural movements in the Global South oppose industrial agriculture in all its manifestations, and increasingly their territories constitute isolated areas rich in unique agrobiodiversity, including genetically diverse material, therefore acting as extant safeguards against the potential ecological failure derived from inappropriate agricultural modernization schemes. It is precisely the ability to generate and maintain diverse crop genetic resources that offer “unique” niche possibilities to small farmers that cannot be replicated by farmers in the North who are condemned to uniform cultivars and to co-exist with GMOs. The “ cibo pulito, justo e buono” that Slow Food promotes, the Fair Trade coffee, bananas, and the organic products so much in demand by northern consumers can only be produced in the agroecological islands of the South. This “difference” inherent to traditional systems, can be strategically utilized to revitalize small farming communities by exploiting opportunities that exist for linking traditional agrobiodiversity with local/national/international markets, as long as these activities are justly compensated by the North and all the segments of the market remain under grassroots control. Consumers of the North can play a major role by supporting these more equitable markets which do not perpetuate the colonial model of “agriculture of the poor for the rich,” but rather a model that promotes small biodiverse farms as the basis for strong rural economies in the Global South. Such economies will not only provide sustainable production of healthy, agroecologically-produced, accessible food for all, but will allow indigenous peoples and small farmers to continue their millennial work of building and conserving the agricultural and natural biodiversity on which we all depend now and even more so in the future.

## China

**All their turns are epistemologically flawed and cause US-China war**

**Pan, 04** – Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University (Chengxin, 2004, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives, 29, pp. 305-331, JSTOR, Hensel)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a **discursive construction of otherness**. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a **threatening**, **absolute other** since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this **reductionist representation** come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but **it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that**, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, **the "China threat" argument**, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, **tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides.**